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Abstract
Many systems that exhibit nonmonotonic behavior have been described
and studied already in the literature. The general notion of nonmonotonic
reasoning, though, has almost always been described only negatively, by
the property it does not enjoy, i.e. monotonicity. We study here general
patterns of nonmonotonic reasoning and try to isolate properties that
could help us map the field of nonmonotonic reasoning by reference to
positive properties. We concentrate on a number of families of nonmono-
tonic consequence relations, defined in the style of Gentzen [13]. Both
proof-theoretic and semantic points of view are developed in parallel. The
former point of view was pioneered by D. Gabbay in [10], while the latter
has been advocated by Y. Shoham in [38]. Five such families are defined
and characterized by representation theorems, relating the two points of
view. One of the families of interest, that of preferential relations, turns
out to have been studied by E. Adams in [2]. The preferential models pro-
posed here are a much stronger tool than Adams’ probabilistic semantics.
The basic language used in this paper is that of propositional logic. The
extension of our results to first order predicate calculi and the study of
the computational complexity of the decision problems described in this
paper will be treated in another paper.
1 Introduction
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1.1 Nonmonotonic reasoning
Nonmonotonic logic is the study of those ways of inferring additional information
from given information that do not satisfy the monotonicity property satisfied
by all methods based on classical (mathematical) logic. In Mathematics, if a
conclusion is warranted on the basis of certain premises, no additional premises
will ever invalidate the conclusion.
In everyday life, however, it seems clear that we, human beings, draw sensible
conclusions from what we know and that, on the face of new information, we
often have to take back previous conclusions, even when the new information we
gathered in no way made us want to take back our previous assumptions. For
example, we may hold the assumption that most birds fly, but that penguins
are birds that do not fly and, learning that Tweety is a bird, infer that it
flies. Learning that Tweety is a penguin, will in no way make us change our
mind about the fact that most birds fly and that penguins are birds that do
not fly, or about the fact that Tweety is a bird. It should make us abandon
our conclusion about its flying capabilities, though. It is most probable that
intelligent automated systems will have to do the same kind of (nonmonotonic)
inferences.
Many researchers have proposed systems that perform such nonmonotonic
inferences. The best known are probably: negation as failure [5], circumscription
[29], the modal system of [30], default logic [35], autoepistemic logic [31] and
inheritance systems [45]. Each of those systems is worth studying by itself,
but a general framework in which those many examples could be compared
and classified is missing. We provide here a first attempt at such a general
framework, concentrating on properties that are or should be enjoyed by at
least important families of nonmonotonic reasoning systems. An up-to-date
survey of the field of nonmonotonic reasoning may be found in [36].
1.2 Nonmonotonic consequence relations
The idea that the best framework to study the deduction process is that of
consequence relations dates back to A. Tarski [42], [41] and [43] (see [44] for an
English translation) and G. Gentzen [12] (see [13] for an English translation and
related papers). For an up-to-date view on monotonic consequence relations,
the reader may consult [3]. Tarski studied the consequences of arbitrary sets of
formulas whereas Gentzen restricted himself to finite such sets. In the presence
of compactness, the difference between the two approaches is small for mono-
tonic consequence relations. For nonmonotonic relations, many different notions
of compactness come to mind, and the relation between Tarski’s infinitistic ap-
proach and Gentzen’s finitistic approach is much less clear. We develop here
a finitistic approach in the style of Gentzen. In [28], D. Makinson developed,
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in parallel with and independently from our effort, an infinitistic view of non-
monotonic consequence relations. Later efforts in this direction, by M. Freund
and D. Lehmann [9], have benefited from the results presented here.
D. Gabbay [10] was probably the first to suggest to focus the study of non-
monotonic logics on their consequence relations. This is a bold step to take
since some of the nonmonotonic systems mentioned above were not meant to
define a consequence relation, as was soon noticed by D. Israel in [17]. D. Gab-
bay asked the question: what are the minimal conditions a consequence relation
should satisfy to represent a bona fide nonmonotonic logic? He proposed three:
reflexivity (see equation 1 in section 3.1), cut (see equation 4) and weak mono-
tonicity (see equation 5). Weak monotonicity has, since, been renamed cautious
monotonicity by D. Makinson [28] and we shall follow this last terminology,
notwithstanding the fact that D. Makinson has now opted for the term cumu-
lative monotony. D. Gabbay argued for his three conditions on proof-theoretic
grounds but provided no semantics against which to check them. He also as-
sumed a poor underlying language for propositions, a language without classical
propositional connectives. In [28], D. Makinson proposed a semantics for Gab-
bay’s logic and proved a completeness result, for a poor language. His models
have a definitely syntactic flavor, whereas the models presented here seem more
truly semantic and more easily suggest rules of inference.
Independently, Y. Shoham in [39] and [38] proposed a general model theory
for nonmonotonic inference. He suggested models that may be described as a
set of worlds equipped with a preference relation: the preference relation is a
partial order and a world v is preferable, in the eyes of the reasoner, to some
other world w if he considers v to be more normal than w. One would then, in
the model, on the basis of a proposition α, conclude, defeasibly, that a propo-
sition β is true if all worlds that satisfy α and are most normal among worlds
satisfying α also satisfy β. Shoham claimed that adequate semantics could be
given to known nonmonotonic systems by using such a preference relation. He
assumed a rich underlying language for propositions, containing all classical
propositional connectives. The idea that nonmonotonic deduction should be
modeled by some normality relation between worlds is very natural and may be
traced back to J. McCarthy. It appears also in relation with epistemic logic in
[15]. One of the conclusions of this paper will be that none of the nonmono-
tonic systems defined so far in the literature, except those based on conditional
logic described in [6], [7] and [34], may represent all nonmonotonic inference
systems that may be defined by preferential models. The framework of prefer-
ential models, therefore, has an expressive power that cannot be captured by
negation as failure, circumscription, default logic or autoepistemic logic. We
do not claim that all this expressive power is needed, but will claim that the
systems mentioned above lack expressive power.
The main point of this work, therefore, is to characterize the consequence
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relations that can be defined by models similar to Shoham’s in terms of proof-
theoretic properties. To this end Gabbay’s conditions have to be augmented.
The class of models corresponding exactly to Gabbay’s conditions is also char-
acterized. The elucidation of the relations between proofs and models that is
achieved in this paper will allow for the design of decision procedures tuned to
different restrictions on the language of propositions or the knowledge bases.
Such decision procedures (or heuristics) could be the core of automated en-
gines of sensible inferences. This paper will not propose any specific system of
nonmonotonic reasoning. Important steps towards such a system, taken after
obtaining the results reported here but before the final redaction of this paper,
are reported in [19], [22] and [20].
At this point it could be useful to state the philosophy of this paper con-
cerning the relative importance of proof-theory and semantics. We consider, in
this paper, the axiomatic systems as the main object of interest (contrary to the
point of view expressed in [24] for example). The different families of models
described in this paper and that provide semantics to the axiomatic systems are
not considered to be an ontological justification for our interest in the formal
systems, but only as a technical tool to study those systems and in particular
settle questions of interderivability and find efficient decision procedures. Pre-
liminary versions of the material contained in this paper appeared in [21] and
[18].
1.3 Conditional logic
In this subsection, the relation between our work and conditional logic will be
briefly surveyed. Since the link, we claim, is mainly at the level of the formal
systems and not at the semantic level, the reader uninterested in conditional
logic may easily skip this subsection.
This work stems from a very different motivation than the vast body of work
concerned with conditional logic and its semantics, (see in particular [40],[24]
and [23]) which is surveyed in [32]. Two main differences must be pointed at.
The first difference is that conditional logic considers a binary intensional con-
nective that can be embedded inside other connectives and even itself, whereas
we consider a binary relation symbol that is part of the meta-language. The
second difference is that the semantics of the conditional implication of condi-
tional logic is essentially different from ours. In conditional logic the formula
α > β is interpreted to mean if α were (or was) true and the situation were
as close as possible, under this hypothesis, to what it really is, then β would be
true. For us α ∼ β means that α is a good enough reason to believe β, or that
β is a plausible consequence of α. The main difference is that conditional logic
refers implicitly to the actual state of the world whereas we do not. M. Gins-
berg’s [14] proposal to harness conditional logic to nonmonotonic reasoning was
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clearly set with the former semantics in mind, and that explains our disagree-
ments concerning the desirability of certain rules, e.g., the rule of Rational
Monotonicity (see equation (25)).
One of the logical systems, P, studied in this paper turns out to be the
flat (i.e. non-nested) fragment of a conditional logic studied by J. Burgess in
[4] and by F. Veltman in [47]. Because of their richer language, the semantics
proposed in those papers are more complex than ours: a ternary relation of
accessibility between worlds is used in place of our binary preference relation.
Moreover, the semantics of J. Burgess are quite different from ours in some other
aspects; our semantics are closer to F. Veltman’s (private communication from
J. van Benthem) and to those studied by J. van Benthem in [46]. There are
some connections between one of our completeness proofs and theirs, but the
restricted language considered here simplifies the models and the proof a great
deal. Our completeness result cannot be derived from the completeness result
of [4] since the latter concerns a extended language and it is not clear that a
proof in the extended language may be translated in the restricted one.
This very fragment had been considered by E. Adams in [2] (see also [1] for
an earlier version and motivation). E. Adams’ purpose was to propose proba-
bilistic semantics for indicative conditionals and not the study of nonmonotonic
logics. Recently J. Pearl and H. Geffner [34] have built upon E. Adams’ logics,
our system P, and his motivation in an effort to provide a system for nonmono-
tonic reasoning. For a gentle introduction, see chapter 10 of [33]. The semantics
proposed here are not probabilistic. Probabilistic semantics that are equivalent
with a restricted family of models (ranked models) will be described elsewhere.
The preferential models presented in this paper provide a much sharper under-
standing of the system P than can obtained by Adams’ methods.
1.4 Plan of this paper
This paper first describes the syntax proposed and compares it to more classical
nonmonotonic systems. Five logical systems and families of models are then
presented in turn and five soundness and completeness results are proven. The
first system, C, corresponds to D. Gabbay’s proposal. The second, stronger,
system, CL, includes a rule of inference that seems original, and corresponds
to models that seem to be more natural. None of those systems above assumes,
in any essential way the existence of the classical logical connectives, if one
allows a finite set of formulas to appear on the left of our symbol ∼ . The
systems below assume the classical connectives. The third, stronger, system, P,
is the central system of this paper. It has particularly appealing semantics. The
fourth system, CM, is stronger than CL but incomparable with P. It provides
an example of a monotonic system that is weaker than classical logic. The last
one of those systems, M, is stronger than all previous systems and equivalent
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to classical propositional logic.
2 The language, comparison with other systems
2.1 Our language
The first step is to define a language in which to express the basic propositions.
We shall assume that a set L of well formed formulas (thereafter formulas) is
given. It is very important, from section 5 on, to assume that L is closed under
the classical propositional connectives. They will be denoted by ¬,∨,∧,→ and
↔. Negation and disjunction will be considered as the basic connectives and the
other ones as defined connectives. The connective→ therefore denotes material
implication. Small greek letters will be used to denote formulas. Since no rule
relating to the quantifiers will be discussed in this paper, the reader may as well
think of L as the set of all propositional formulas on a given set of propositional
variables.
With the language L, we assume semantics given by a set U , the elements
of which will be referred to as worlds, and a binary relation of satisfaction
between worlds and formulas. The set U is the universe of reference, it is the set
of all worlds that we shall consider possible. If L is the set of all propositional
formulas on a given set of propositional variables, U is a subset of the set of
all assignments of truth values to the propositional variables. We reserve to
ourselves the right to consider universes of reference that are strict subsets of
the set of all models of L. In this way we shall be able to model strict constraints,
such as penguins are birds, in a simple and natural way, by restricting U to the
set of all worlds that satisfy the material implication penguin→ bird. Typical
universes of reference are given by the set of all propositional worlds that satisfy
a given set of formulas.
We shall assume that the satisfaction relation behaves as expected as far as
propositional connectives are concerned. If u ∈ U and α, β ∈ L we write u |= α
if u satisfies α and assume:
1) u |= ¬α iff u 6|= α.
2) u |= α ∨ β iff u |= α or u |= β.
The notions of satisfaction of a set of formulas, validity of a formula and
satisfiability of a set of formulas are defined as usual. We shall write |= α if α
is valid, i.e. iff ∀u ∈ U , u |= α, and write α |= β for |= α→ β.
We shall also make the following assumption of compactness1: a set of
formulas is satisfiable if all of its finite subsets are.
1The compactness assumption is needed only to treat consequence relations defined as the
set of all assertions entailed by infinite sets of conditional assertions.
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Classical theorems of compactness show that if we take L to be a propo-
sitional calculus or a first order predicate calculus and U to be the set of all
models that satisfy a given set of formulas, then the assumption of compactness
described above is satisfied. Notice that the set of valid formulas, in our sense,
is not, in general, closed under substitutions.
All that is done in the sequel depends on the choice of L and U , though we
shall often forget this dependence. For this work, the basic language L may
well be fixed, but we shall sometimes have to consider different universes of
reference. As noticed above, if Γ is a set of formulas then the subset of U that
contains only the worlds that satisfy Γ (this set of worlds will be denoted by
UΓ) is a suitable universe.
If α and β are formulas, then the pair α ∼ β (read if α, normally β, or β
is a plausible consequence of α) is called a conditional assertion (assertion in
short). The formula α is the antecedent of the assertion, β is its consequent.
The meaning we attach to such an assertion, and against which the reader
should check the logical systems to be presented in the upcoming sections, is the
following: if α is true, I am willing to (defeasibly) jump to the conclusion that β
is true. Our choice, then, is to look at normally as some binary notion. It is clear
that efforts to understand normally as some unary notion, e.g. translating if α,
normally β as N (α→ β) or as α→ Nβ for some unary modal operator cannot
be expressive enough. Consequence relations are sets of conditional assertions.
Not all such sets, though, seem to be worthy of that name and our use of the
term for any such set is running against a fairly well-established terminology.
The term conditional assertion is taken from [37] (p. 417).
We hope that, by considering nonmonotonic consequence as a meta-notion,
but allowing basic propositions on a rich language, we strike at the right lan-
guage. It allows a new approach of questions about computational complexity
(see [25] for some general decidability results), but this is left for future work.
2.2 Pragmatics
We shall now briefly sketch why we think that the study of nonmonotonic con-
sequence relations will be a benefit to the field of automated nonmonotonic
reasoning. The queries one wants to ask an automated knowledge base are for-
mulas (of L) and query β should be interpreted as: is β expected to be true? To
answer such a query the knowledge base will apply some inference procedure
to the information it has. We shall now propose a description of the different
types of information a knowledge base has.
The first type of information (first in the sense it is the more stable, changes
less rapidly) is coded in the universe of reference U , that describes both hard
constraints (e.g. dogs are mammals) and points of definition (e.g. youngster is
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equivalent to not adult). Equivalently, such information will be given by a set
of formulas defining U to be the set of all worlds that satisfy all the formulas of
this set.
The second type of information consists of a set of conditional assertions
describing the soft constraints (e.g. birds normally fly). This set describes what
we know about the way the world generally behaves. This set of conditional
assertions will be called the knowledge base, and denoted by K.
The third type of information describes our information about the specific
situation at hand (e.g. it is a bird). This information will be represented by a
formula.
Our decision to consider the first type of information as a separate type is
not the only possible way to go. One could, equivalently, treat a formula α
of the first type as the conditional assertion ¬ α ∼ false. One could also have
decided to introduce all information of the third type as information of the first
type.
Our inference procedure will work in the following way, to answer query β.
In the context of the universe of reference U , it will try to deduce (in a way that
is to be discovered yet) the conditional assertion α ∼ β from the knowledge
base K. This is a particularly elegant way of looking at the inference process:
the inference process deduces conditional assertions from sets of conditional
assertions. Clearly any system of nonmonotonic reasoning may be considered in
this way. So, we may look at circumscription, default logic and other systems as
mechanisms to deduce conditional assertions from sets of conditional assertions.
We shall now briefly investigate the expressive power of some of those systems
in this light.
2.3 Expressiveness of our language
We shall now compare the expressive power of the language proposed here, i.e.
conditional assertions, to that of previous approaches. Our purpose is to show
that circumscription, autoepistemic logic and default logic all suffer from funda-
mental weaknesses, either in their expressive capabilities or in their treatment
of conditional information. Let α, β and γ be formulas. We shall concentrate on
the comparison of two different conditional assertions. The conditional assertion
A is γ ∧ α ∼ β. The conditional assertion B is γ ∼ ¬α ∨ β, i.e. γ ∼ α→ β.
To simplify matters we shall just treat the special case when the formula γ is a
tautology. In this case A is α ∼ β and B is true ∼ ¬α ∨ β.
The assertion A expresses that if α, normally β. Assertion B expresses
that Normally, if α is true then β is true. Those assertions have very different
meanings, at least when α is normally false. Assertion A says that in this
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exceptional case when α is true, one also expects β to be true. Assertion B, on
the other hand, is automatically verified if α is normally false. In any case it
seems that it is perfectly possible that B does not say anything about cases when
α is true (if these are exceptional). Take for example α to be it is a penguin and
β to be it flies. If we talk about birds, it seems perfectly reasonable to accept
B which says that normally, either it is not a penguin or it flies, since normally
birds fly (and normally birds are not penguins, but this remark is not necessary).
Nevertheless, one should be reluctant to accept A which says penguins normally
fly. It seems clear to us, then, that A and B have different meanings and that
A does not follow from B. We agree with Y. Shoham, and this opinion will be
supported in the sequel, to say that B should follow from A, but we do not have
to argue that case now. In the main system to be presented in this paper, P,
the assertion A is strictly stronger than B. In the weaker systems C and CT,
A and B are incomparable. In CM, B is strictly stronger than A, and this is
one of the reasons we shall reject it as a system of nonmonotonic reasoning. It
is only in M, which is equivalent to classical logic, that A and B are equivalent.
Let us consider now the expression of A and B, first using circumscrip-
tion. For circumscription, A would be expressed as: α ∧ ¬abnormal → β. In
fact, since there would probably be a number of different abnormalities floating
around, we probably should have written: α ∧ ¬abnormal543 → β, but this is
not significant. On the other hand B would be written as: ¬abnormal → (α→ β).
One immediately notices that the two formulations are logically equivalent. We
conclude that circumscription would need some additional mechanism to dis-
tinguish between A and B. In practise, the user of circumscription would give
different priorities (relative to the priorities of abnormalities of the other as-
sertions of the knowledge base), to the two abnormalities considered here; but
there is no standard procedure to determine priorities.
Let us now use autoepistemic logic. The assertion A would be expressed as:
α ∧M(β)→ β. On the other hand B would be expressed as: M(α→ β)→ (α→ β).
Since the modality M is interpreted as ¬ K¬ for some epistemic modality K it
satisfies: α ∧M(β)→M(α→ β). We immediately notice that, for autoepis-
temic logic, B is strictly stronger than A. This is not what we expect.
Let us try default logic now. The natural translation of A in default logic
would be the normal default: (α, β;β), whose meaning is if α has been concluded
to be true and β is consistent with what has been concluded so far, conclude
that β is true. The assertion B would be expressed as: (true, α→ β;α→ β),
which means that in any situation in which α→ β is consistent, one should (or
could) conclude this last formula to be true. We immediately see that in all
situations in which α has been already concluded to be true, both defaults act
exactly in the same way, which seems very questionable. In situations in which
α has been concluded to be false, the first default is inapplicable, whereas the
second default may be applied but yields a trivial result (we do not get any
9
new information from applying it). Again, both defaults are equivalent, but,
in this case, this seems to fit our intuition. In situations in which neither
α nor its negation have been concluded, the first default cannot be applied.
For the second default, in certain situations it cannot be applied either, but
in others it may be applied and yields non trivial conclusions. We conclude
from this study that in some situations both defaults are equivalent, in others
the second is more powerful than the first one. Again this is not what we
expected. A particularly spectacular case of this problem occurs when β is a
logical contradiction. The assertion α ∼ false has a very clear meaning: it says
if α, normally anything. It expresses the very strong statement that we are
willing to disconsider completely the possibility of α being true. To see that
this may express very useful information, just think of α as I am the Queen
of England. Most people would probably be willing to have α ∼ false in their
personal knowledge base. As remarked above, this corresponds to restricting U
to those worlds that do not satisfy α. Now, the translation, as a normal default,
of such an assertion, which is: (α, false; false), is never applicable since false is
never consistent with anything. Therefore this default gives no information at
all. Somehow, all the strength of our assertion has been lost in the translation.
We hope to have convinced the reader that one should look for formalisms
in which the distinction between A and B is clear and understandable.
3 Cumulative reasoning
3.1 Cumulative consequence relations
We shall, first, study the weakest of our logical systems. It embodies what we
think, at this moment, in agreement with D. Gabbay [10], are the rock-bottom
properties without which a system should not be considered a logical system.
This appreciation probably only reflects the fact that, so far, we do not know
anything interesting about weaker systems. The order of the exposition, roughly
from weaker to stronger systems, is aimed at minimizing repetitions: rules that
may be derived in weaker systems may also be derived in stronger ones.
We shall name this system C, for cumulative. It is closely related to the
cumulative inference studied by D. Makinson in [28], and seems to correspond
exactly, to what D. Gabbay proposed in [10]. The systemC consists of a number
of inference rules and an axiom schema.
Definition 1 A consequence relation ∼ is said to be cumulative iff it con-
tains all instances of the Reflexivity axiom and is closed under the inference
rules of Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, Cut and Cautious
Monotonicity that will be described below.
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We shall now describe and discuss the axioms and rules mentioned above
and some derived rules. The purpose of the discussion is to weight the meaning
of the axioms and rules when the relation . . . ∼ . . . is interpreted as if . . . ,
normally . . ..
α ∼ α (Reflexivity) (1)
Reflexivity seems to be satisfied universally by any kind of reasoning based
on some notion of consequence. Relations that do not satisfy it, probably express
some notion of theory change. It corresponds to the axiom ID of conditional
logic.
The next two rules express the influence of the underlying logic, defined by
the universe U , on the notion of plausible consequence. Their role is similar to
that of the rules of consequence of [16].
|= α↔ β , α ∼ γ
β ∼ γ
(Left Logical Equivalence) (2)
Left Logical Equivalence expresses the requirement that logically equiva-
lent formulas have exactly the same consequences and corresponds to rule RCEA
of conditional logic. The consequences of a formula should depend on its mean-
ing, not on its form. In the presence of the other rules of C, it could have been
weakened to: from α ∧ β ∼ γ conclude β ∧ α ∼ γ.
The next rule, Right Weakening expresses the fact that one must be ready
to accept as plausible consequences all that is logically implied by what one
thinks are plausible consequences. In other words, plausible consequences are
closed under logical consequences. It corresponds to the rule RCK of conditional
logic.
|= α→ β , γ ∼ α
γ ∼ β
(Right Weakening) (3)
Right Weakening obviously implies that one may replace logically equiv-
alent formulas by one another on the right of the ∼ symbol. Reflexivity
and Right Weakening already imply that α ∼ β if α |= β. All nonmonotonic
systems proposed so far in the literature satisfy Reflexivity, Left Logical
Equivalence and Right Weakening.
Our next rule is named Cut because of its similarity to Gentzen’s Schnitt.
α ∧ β ∼ γ , α ∼ β
α ∼ γ
(Cut) (4)
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It expresses the fact that one may, in his way towards a plausible conclusion,
first add an hypothesis to the facts he knows to be true and prove the plausibil-
ity of his conclusion from this enlarged set of facts and then deduce (plausibly)
this added hypothesis from the facts. This is a valid way of reasoning in mono-
tonic logic, and, as will be seen soon, its validity does not imply monotonicity,
therefore it seems to us quite reasonable to accept it. Its meaning, it should
be stressed, is that a plausible conclusion is as secure as the assumptions it is
based on. Therefore it may be added (this is the origin of the term cumula-
tive) into the assumptions. There is no loss of confidence along the chain of
derivations. One may well be unwilling to accept such a principle and think
that, on the contrary, no conclusion of a derivation is ever as secure as the
assumptions. Indeed, recently, D. Gabbay [11] suggested to replace Cut by a
weaker rule. In this paper, we shall study only systems that validate Cut. Our
conclusion is that there are many interesting nonmonotonic systems that satisfy
Cut. It should be mentioned that some probabilistic interpretations invalidate
Cut (Adams’ validates it), e.g. interpreting a conditional assertion α ∼ β as
meaning that the corresponding conditional probability p(β | α) is larger than
some q < 1.
It is easy to see that circumscription satisfies Cut, at least when all models
that have to be considered are finite. In [28], D. Makinson shows that default
logic satisfies Cut too. The following example should help convince the reader
to endorse Cut. Suppose we tell you we expect it will be raining tonight and if
it rains tonight, normally Fireball should win the race tomorrow. Wouldn’t you
conclude that we think that normally, Fireball should win the race tomorrow?
Our last rule, named Cautious Monotonicity, is taken from D. Gab-
bay [10]. It corresponds to axiom A3 of Burgess’ system S in [4]. The same
property is named triangulation in [34].
α ∼ β , α ∼ γ
α ∧ β ∼ γ
(Cautious Monotonicity) (5)
Cautious Monotonicity expresses the fact that learning a new fact, the
truth of which could have been plausibly concluded should not invalidate previ-
ous conclusions. It is a central property of all the systems considered here. The
origin of the term cautious monotonicity will be explained in section 3.3. The
probabilistic semantics that invalidates Cut also invalidates Cautious Mono-
tonicity. In [28], D. Makinson showed that default logic, even when defaults
are normal, does not always satisfyCautious Monotonicity. Circumscription,
though, satisfies it, at least when all models considered are finite. What are our
reasons to accept Cautious Monotonicity? On the general level, D. Gabbay’s
argumentation seems convincing: if α is reason enough to believe β and also to
believe γ, then α and β should also be enough to make us believe γ, since α was
enough anyway and, on this basis, β was expected. From a pragmatic point of
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view Cautious Monotonicity is very important since we typically learn new
facts and we would like to minimize the updating we have to make to our beliefs.
Cautious Monotonicity and Cut together tell us, as will be made clear in
lemma 1, that if the new facts learned were expected to be true, nothing changes
in our beliefs. This will help minimizing the updating. From a semantic point of
view, we want to argue the case for Cautious Monotonicity on the following
example. Suppose we tell you we expect it will be raining tonight and normally,
Fireball should win the race tomorrow. Wouldn’t you conclude that we think
that even if it rains tonight, normally Fireball should win the race tomorrow?
Lemma 1 The rules of Cut and Cautious Monotonicity may be expressed
together by the following principle: if α ∼ β then the plausible consequences of
α and of α ∧ β coincide.
Let us now consider some rules that may be derived in C.
3.2 Derived rules of C
The first rule corresponds to CSO of conditional logic and expresses the fact that
two propositions that are plausible consequences of each other, have exactly the
same plausible consequences.
α ∼ β , β ∼ α , α ∼ γ
β ∼ γ
(Equivalence) (6)
The second rule corresponds to CC of conditional logic and expresses the fact
that the conjunction of two plausible consequences is a plausible consequence.
α ∼ β , α ∼ γ
α ∼ β ∧ γ
(And) (7)
The third rule amounts to modus ponens in the consequent.
α ∼ β → γ , α ∼ β
α ∼ γ
(MPC) (8)
The fourth rule is perhaps less expected and brought up here to show that
C is not as weak as one could think. It will be put to use in section 5.3.
α ∨ β ∼ α , α ∼ γ
α ∨ β ∼ γ
(9)
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Lemma 2 Equivalence, And, MPC and (9) are derived rules of the system
C.
Proof: For Equivalence, use first Cautious Monotonicity to show that
α ∧ β ∼ γ, then Left Logical Equivalence to get β ∧ α ∼ γ and then con-
clude by Cut.
For And, first use Cautious Monotonicity to show α ∧ β ∼ γ. Then,
since α ∧ β ∧ γ |= β ∧ γ, we have: α ∧ β ∧ γ ∼ β ∧ γ. Using Cut we conclude
that α ∧ β ∼ β ∧ γ and the desired conclusion is obtained by one more use of
Cut.
For MPC, use And and Right Weakening.
For (9), remark that, since α |= α ∨ β, we have α ∼ α ∨ β. This, with the
hypotheses, enables us to apply Equivalence and conclude.
3.3 Monotonicity
We shall now justify the term Cautious Monotonicity and introduce four
new rules. They cannot be derived in C. The first rule is Monotonicity, or
Left Strengthening.
|= α→ β , β ∼ γ
α ∼ γ
(Monotonicity) (10)
It is clear that both Left Logical Equivalence and Cautious Mono-
tonicity are special cases ofMonotonicity. This explains the name Cautious
Monotonicity.
The next rule corresponds to the easy half of the deduction theorem.
α ∼ β → γ
α ∧ β ∼ γ
(EHD) (11)
The next two rules have been considered by many.
α ∼ β , β ∼ γ
α ∼ γ
(Transitivity) (12)
α ∼ β
¬β ∼ ¬α
(Contraposition) (13)
It is easy to find apparent counter-examples to each one of the last four
rules in the folklore of nonmonotonic reasoning. The next lemmas will explain
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why. Let us notice that, nevertheless, adding the first three of those rules to the
system C leaves us with a system, CM, that is strictly weaker than classical
monotonic logic, as will be seen in section 6. The next lemmas will describe
some of the relations between the rules above.
Lemma 3 In the presence of the rules of C, the rules ofMonotonicity, EHD,
and Transitivity are all equivalent.
Proof: We shall not mention the uses of Reflexivity, Left Logical Equiv-
alence and Right Weakening. Monotonicity implies EHD, using And.
EHD implies Monotonicity. Monotonicity implies Transitivity, using
Cut. Transitivity implies Monotonicity.
Lemma 4 In the presence of Left Logical Equivalence and Right Weak-
ening, Contraposition implies Monotonicity.
Proof: Use Contraposition, then Right Weakening and Contraposition
again.
The results of section 6 show that Monotonicity does not imply Contra-
position even in the presence of the rules of C. Since Monotonicity seems
counter-intuitive in nonmonotonic systems, the two lemmas above show we
should not accept EHD, Transitivity or Contraposition.
3.4 Cumulative models
We shall now develop a semantic account of cumulative reasoning, i.e. reasoning
using the rules of the system C. We shall define a family of models (without
any reference to the rules of C) and show how each model defines a consequence
relation. We shall then show that each model of the family defines a cumulative
consequence relation (this is a soundness result) and that every cumulative con-
sequence relation is defined by some model of the family (this is a completeness
result, or a representation theorem).
Let us, first, describe the models informally. A model essentially consists
of a set of states (they represent possible states of affairs, including perhaps
the state of mind or knowledge of the reasoner) and a binary relation on those
states. The relation represents the preferences the reasoner may have between
different states: he could for example prefer the states in which he is rich to
the ones in which he is poor, and prefer the states in which he knows he is
rich to those in which he is rich but does not know about it. More realistically,
one could prefer states in which Tweety is a bird and flies to those in which
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Tweety is a bird but does not fly. The reasoner, described by a model, accepts
a conditional assertion α ∼ β iff all those states that are most preferred among
all states satisfying α, satisfy β. The reader should notice we have not yet said
what is a state and what formulas are satisfied by a state.
We shall not define further the notion of a state, but suppose that every
state is, in a model, labeled with a set of worlds (intuitively the set of all worlds
the reasoner thinks are possible in this state). Modal logicians will identify our
labels as S5 models. Considering a binary relation on states labeled by sets of
worlds, instead of considering a binary relation on sets of worlds, gives us an
additional degree of freedom in building models: the same set of worlds may
appear at many states (that are not equivalent from the point of view of the
binary relation). This additional freedom is vital for the representation theorem
to hold, and was missing from Shoham’s account [38].
Some technical definitions are needed first.
Definition 2 Let ≺ be a binary relation on a set U . We shall say that ≺ is
asymmetric iff ∀s, t ∈ U such that s ≺ t, we have t 6≺ s.
Definition 3 Let V ⊆ U and ≺ a binary relation on U . We shall say that
t ∈ V is minimal in V iff ∀s ∈ V , s 6≺ t. We shall say that t ∈ V is a minimum
of V iff ∀s ∈ V such that s 6= t, t ≺ s.
The reader has noticed that, though the last definitions sound familiar in the
case the relation ≺ is a strict partial order, we intend to use them for arbitrary
relations.
Definition 4 Let P ⊆ U and ≺ a binary relation on U . We shall say that P is
smooth iff ∀t ∈ P , either ∃s minimal in P , such that s ≺ t or t is itself minimal
in P .
We shall use the following lemma, the proof of which is obvious.
Lemma 5 Let U be a set and ≺ an asymmetric binary relation on U . If U has
a minimum it is unique, it is a minimal element of U and U is smooth.
Definition 5 A cumulative model is a triple 〈 S, l,≺〉, where S is a set, the
elements of which are called states, l : S 7→ 2U is a function that labels every
state with a non-empty set of worlds and ≺ is a binary relation on S, satisfying
the smoothness condition that will be defined below in definition 7.
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The relation ≺ represents the reasoner’s preference among states. The fact
that s ≺ t means that, in the agent’s mind, s is preferred to or more natural
than t. As will be formally defined below, the agent is willing to conclude β
from α, if all most natural states which satisfy α also satisfy β.
Definition 6 Let 〈 S, l,≺〉 be as above. If α is a formula, we shall say that
s ∈ S satisfies α and write s≡ α iff for every world m ∈ l(s), m |= α. The set:
{s | s ∈ S, s≡ α} of all states that satisfy α will be denoted by α̂.
Definition 7 (smoothness condition) A triple 〈 S, l,≺〉 is said to satisfy the
smoothness condition iff, ∀α ∈ L, the set α̂ is smooth.
The smoothness condition is necessary to ensure the validity of Cautious
Monotonicity. It is akin to the limit assumption of Stalnaker [40] and Lewis [24],
but it is defined in a more general context. Smoothness is the property called,
contrary to mathematical usage, well-foundedness in [8] and in [26].
We shall now describe how a cumulative model defines a consequence rela-
tion.
Definition 8 Suppose a cumulative model W = 〈S, l,≺〉 is given. The conse-
quence relation defined by W will be denoted by ∼W and is defined by: α ∼W β
iff for any s minimal in α̂, s≡ β.
Definition 9 A triple 〈 S, l,≺〉 is said to be a strong cumulative model iff
1. the relation ≺ is asymmetric
2. for each formula α, the set α̂ has a minimum.
It is clear that strong cumulative models are cumulative models, i.e. satisfy
the smoothness condition. The definition of cumulative models and the conse-
quence relations they define seems quite natural, i.e. a preference relation on
epistemic states, but one should not forget that the preference relation ≺ is not
required to be a partial order and that in triples (even when the set of states is
finite) in which the relation ≺ is not a partial order, the smoothness condition
is, in general, not an easy thing to check.
3.5 Characterization of cumulative relations
In this section we shall characterize the relation between cumulative consequence
relations and cumulative models. The first lemma is obvious.
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Lemma 6 Let W = 〈 S, l,≺〉 be a cumulative model. For α, β ∈ L, α̂ ∧ β =
α̂ ∩ β̂.
Lemma 7 (Soundness) For any cumulative model W , the consequence rela-
tion ∼W it defines is a cumulative relation, i.e. all the rules of the system C
are satisfied by the relations defined by cumulative models.
Proof: The proof is easy and we shall only treat Cut and Cautious Mono-
tonicity. The smoothness condition is needed only for dealing with Cautious
Monotonicity.
For Cut, suppose all minimal elements of α̂ satisfy β and all minimal ele-
ments of α̂ ∧ β satisfy γ. Any minimal element of α̂ satisfies β and therefore
satisfies α ∧ β. Since it is minimal in α̂ and α̂ ∧ β ⊆ α̂, it is also minimal in
α̂ ∧ β.
ForCautious Monotonicity, the smoothness condition is needed. Suppose
that α ∼W β and α ∼W γ. We have to prove that α ∧ β ∼W γ, i.e., that, for
any s minimal in α̂ ∧ β, s≡ γ. Such an s is in α̂. We shall prove that it is
minimal in α̂. By the smoothness condition, if it were not minimal, there would
be an s′ minimal in α̂ such that s′ ≺ s. But α ∼W β therefore s′≡ β and then
s′ ∈ α̂ ∩ β̂. By lemma 6 we conclude that s′ is in α̂ ∧ β, in contradiction with
the minimality of s in this set. Therefore s is minimal in α̂ and, since α ∼W γ,
one concludes: s≡ γ.
We now intend to show that, given any cumulative relation ∼ , one may
build a cumulative model W that defines a consequence relation ∼W that is
exactly ∼ . Suppose, therefore, that ∼ satisfies the rules of C. All definitions
will be relative to this relation.
Definition 10 The world m ∈ U is said to be a normal world for α iff ∀β ∈ L
such that α ∼ β, m |= β.
So, a world is normal for a formula if it satisfies all of its plausible conse-
quences. Obviously, if the consequence relation we start from satisfies Reflex-
ivity, a normal world for α satisfies α.
Lemma 8 Suppose a consequence relation ∼ satisfies Reflexivity, Right
Weakening and And, and let α, β ∈ L. All normal worlds for α satisfy β iff
α ∼ β.
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Proof: The if part follows from definition 10. Let us show the only if part.
Suppose α 6∼ β, we shall build a normal world for α that does not satisfy
β. Let Γ0
def
= {¬β} ∪ {δ | α ∼ δ}. It is enough to show that Γ0 is satisfiable.
Suppose not, then, by the compactness assumption, there exists a finite subset
of Γ0 that is not satisfiable and therefore a finite set D ⊆ {δ | α ∼ δ} such that
|=
∧
δ∈D δ → β. Now, |= α→
(∧
δ∈D δ → β
)
and, by Reflexivity and Right
Weakening α ∼
(∧
δ∈D δ → β
)
. But, usingAnd one gets α ∼
∧
δ∈D δ. Then,
usingMPC (the proof of lemma 2 shows that onlyAnd andRight Weakening
are needed to derive MPC), one concludes α ∼ β, a contradiction.
Definition 11 We shall say that α is equivalent to β and write α ∼ β iff α ∼ β
and β ∼ α.
Lemma 9 α ∼ β iff ∀γ α ∼ γ ⇔ β ∼ γ. The relation ∼ is therefore an
equivalence relation.
Proof: The if part follows from Reflexivity and the only if part from Equiv-
alence.
The equivalence class of a formula α, under ∼, will be denoted by α¯.
Definition 12 α¯ ≤ β¯ iff ∃α′ ∈ α¯ such that β ∼ α′.
It is clear that the definition of ≤ makes sense, i.e. does not depend on the
choice of the representatives α and β. The relation ≤ is reflexive but is not in
general transitive.
Lemma 10 The relation ≤ is antisymmetric.
Proof: Suppose α¯ ≤ β¯ and β¯ ≤ α¯. There are formulas α′, α′′ ∈ α¯ and β′, β′′ ∈ β¯
such that: β′ ∼ α′′ and α′ ∼ β′′. By lemma 9, β′′ ∼ α′′ and α′′ ∼ β′′. Therefore
α′′ ∼ β′′, and α¯ = β¯.
The cumulative model W will be defined the following way: W
def
= 〈 S, l,≺〉,
where S
def
= L/∼ is the set of all equivalence classes of formulas under the relation
∼, l(α¯)
def
= {m | m is a normal world for α} and α¯ ≺ β¯ iff α¯ ≤ β¯ and α¯ 6= β¯ (the
relation≤ has been defined in definition 12). One easily checks the definition of l
does not depend on the choice of the representative α and that ≺ is asymmetric.
Lemma 11 For any α ∈ L the state α¯ is a minimum of α̂.
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Proof: Indeed suppose s 6= α¯ and s ∈ α̂. This last assumption implies, by the
definition of α̂, that every world of l(s) satisfies α. Let s = β¯. By the definition
of l, every normal world for β satisfies α. By lemma 8, β ∼ α, and therefore
α¯ ≤ s. Since s 6= α¯ we conclude α¯ ≺ s.
It follows from lemma 11 and the fact that ≺ is asymmetric that the model
W defined above is a strong cumulative model. We may now prove what we
wanted to achieve.
Lemma 12 α ∼ β iff α ∼W β.
Proof: Lemmas 11 and 5 imply that the only minimal state of α̂ is α¯, therefore
α ∼W β iff all normal worlds for α satisfy β and lemma 8 implies the conclusion.
Theorem 1 (Representation theorem for cumulative relations) A con-
sequence relation is a cumulative consequence relation iff it is defined by some
cumulative model.
Proof: The if part is lemma 7. The only if part follows from the construction
of W and lemma 11 (that shows W is a cumulative model) and lemma 12.
One may remark that the representation result proved is a bit stronger than
what is claimed in theorem 1: any cumulative consequence relation is the con-
sequence relation defined by a strong cumulative model. It is now easy to study
the notion of entailment yielded by cumulative models.
Corollary 1 Let K be a set of conditional assertions, and α, β ∈ L, the follow-
ing conditions are equivalent. In case they hold we shall say that K cumulatively
entails α ∼ β.
1. for all cumulative models V such that ∼V contains K, α ∼V β
2. α ∼ β has a proof from K in the system C.
Proof: From lemma 7 one sees that 2) implies 1). For the other direction,
suppose 2) is not true. The smallest consequence relation closed under the rules
of C that containsK is a cumulative consequence relation that does not contain
α ∼ β. By theorem 1, there is a cumulative model that defines it. This model
shows property 1) does not hold.
Corollary 2 Let K be a set of conditional assertions. There is a cumulative
model that satisfies exactly those assertions that are cumulatively entailed by K.
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The following compactness result follows.
Corollary 3 (compactness) K entails α ∼ β iff a finite subset of K does.
Proof: Proofs are always finite and therefore use only a finite number of as-
sumptions from K.
To conclude our study of cumulative reasoning, let us say that the system
C provides an interesting general setting in which to study nonmonotonic rea-
soning. Weaker systems are probably very different from systems that are at
least as strong as C. The system C is probably too weak to be the backbone
of realistic inference systems and cumulative models are quite cumbersome to
manipulate. The next section will propose nicer models and an additional rule
of inference.
4 Cumulative reasoning with Loop
4.1 Cumulative ordered models
The original motivation for the study of the system CL, that will be proposed in
this section, stems from semantic considerations. Later on, a number of results,
including the result that will be described in section 5.6, which says that, if
one restricts oneself to Horn assertions, then the system CL is as strong as P,
seemed to point out that CL is worth studying.
Looking back on the cumulative models of definition 5, one may wonder why
we did not require the binary relation ≺ to be a strict partial order. We could
have required it to be asymmetric without jeopardizing the representation theo-
rem, but the construction of section 3.5 builds a model in which ≺ is not always
transitive. Nevertheless, preferences could probably be assumed to be transitive
and, most important, transitivity of ≺ eases enormously the task of checking
the smoothness condition: if ≺ is a partial order (strict), then all finite models
(models in which the set of states is finite) satisfy the smoothness condition, and
even all well-founded models (in which there is no infinite descending ≺-chain)
do. Could we have required ≺ to be a partial order? In other terms, are there
rules that are not valid for cumulative models in general but are valid for all
cumulative models the preference relation of which is a strict partial order? We
shall now give a positive answer to this last question and exactly characterize
this sub-family of cumulative models.
Definition 13 A cumulative ordered model is a cumulative model in which the
relation ≺ is a strict partial order.
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4.2 The system CL
The following rule, named Loop after its form, will be shown to be the exact
counterpart of transitivity of the preference relation in the models. It says that,
if propositions may be arranged in a loop, in a way each one is a plausible con-
sequence of the previous one, then each one of them is a plausible consequence
of any one of them, i.e. they are all equivalent in the sense of Equivalence.
Definition 14 The system CL consists of all the rules of C and the following:
α0 ∼ α1 , α1 ∼ α2 , . . . , αk−1 ∼ αk , αk ∼ α0
α0 ∼ αk
(Loop) (14)
A consequence relation that satisfies all rules of CL is said to be loop-cumulative.
Lemma 13 The following is a derived rule of CL, for any i, j = 0, . . . k.
α0 ∼ α1 , α1 ∼ α2 , . . . , αk−1 ∼ αk , αk ∼ α0
αi ∼ αj
(15)
Proof: It is clear that, because of the invariance of the assumptions under cyclic
permutation, the conclusion of Loop, could as well have been αi+1 ∼ αi, for
any i = 0, . . . , k (addition is understood modulo k+1). From Equivalence one
can then conclude αi ∼ αj , for any i, j = 0, . . . , k.
It seems the rule Loop has never been considered in the literature. We
feel it is an acceptable principle of nonmonotonic reasoning. It is particularly
interesting that Loop does not mention any of the propositional connectives.
Lemma 14 Loop is valid in all cumulative ordered models.
Proof: LetW = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a cumulative ordered model such that αi ∼W αi+1
for i = 0, . . . , k (addition is understood modulo k+1) and let s0 ∈ S be a minimal
state in α̂0. We shall show that s0≡ αk. Since α0 ∼W α1, the state s0 must be
in α̂1. By the smoothness condition, if s0 is not minimal in α̂1 then there is a
state s1 minimal in α̂1 such that s1 ≺ s0. Similarly, for every i = 0, . . . , k there
is a state si minimal in α̂i such that si = si−1 or si ≺ si−1. Since ≺ is transitive,
sk = s0 or sk ≺ s0. But sk is minimal in α̂k and αk ∼W α0, we conclude that
sk ∈ α̂0. But s0 is minimal in α̂0, we conclude that sk = s0 and s0≡ αk.
Lemma 15 The rule Loop is not valid in cumulative models.
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Proof: Let L be the propositional calculus on the propositional variables
p0, p1, p2 and U be the set of all propositional models on those variables. We
shall build a cumulative model V = 〈S, l,≺〉 such that pi ∼V pi+1 for all i =
0, . . . , 2 (addition is modulo 3) but p0 6∼V p2. The set S has four states: si, for
i = −1, . . . , 2. For every i = 0, . . . , 2 we have s−1 ≺ si and si+1 ≺ si. Notice
that ≺ is not transitive. Let us now describe l. For i = 0, . . . , 2, l(si) is the
set of all worlds satisfying pi and pi+1, and l(s−1) is the set of all worlds sat-
isfying at least two out of the three variables. First we want to show that V
satisfies the smoothness condition. Clearly all subsets of S that contain s−1 are
smooth since s−1 is a minimum in S. A set that contains at most two elements
is always smooth. We conclude that the only subset of S that is not smooth is
A
def
= {s0, s1, s2}. We must show that there is no formula α such that A = α̂.
Let α be any formula and let i = 0, . . . , 2. If si ∈ α̂ all worlds of l(si) must
satisfy α and by definition of l, pi ∧ pi+1 |= α. We conclude that if A ⊆ α̂ then
any world that satisfies at least two of the variables satisfies α. We conclude
that α̂ must therefore also include s−1.
To see that pi ∼V pi+1, notice that p̂i = {si−1, si} and that, since si ≺ si−1,
the only minimal state in p̂i is si that satisfies pi+1. The only thing left to check
is that p0 6∼V p2. But we just noticed that the only minimal state of p̂0 is s0
and clearly s0 6≡ p2.
4.3 Characterization of loop-cumulative consequence re-
lations
We now want to show that, given any loop-cumulative relation ∼ one may
build a cumulative ordered model V such that ∼V is equal to ∼ . Suppose
∼ is such a relation and W = 〈S, l,≺〉 is the cumulative model built out of ∼
in section 3.5. Let ≺+ be the transitive closure of ≺. First we shall show that,
since ∼ satisfies Loop, the relation ≺+ is a strict partial order.
Lemma 16 The relation ≺+ is irreflexive and therefore a strict partial order.
Proof: Suppose α¯0 ≺+ α¯0. Since ≺ is asymmetric, it is irreflexive and t here
must be some n > 0 such that for i = 0, . . . , n, α¯i ≺ α¯i+1 (addition is modulo
n). From the definitions of ≺ and ≤, we see that, for i = 0, . . . , n, there are
formulas α′i such that αi ∼ α
′
i and αi+1 ∼ α
′
i. From lemma 9, we conclude
that α′i+1 ∼ α
′
i for i = 0, . . . , n. By Loop we see that α
′
i ∼ α
′
i+1 and therefore
α′i+1 ∼ α
′
i and αi ∼ αi+1. But this contradicts the asymmetry of ≺. We have
shown that ≺ is irreflexive. Since it is transitive by construction it is a strict
partial order.
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Let us now define V
def
= 〈S, l,≺+〉 where S, l and ≺ are as in the definition
of W .
Lemma 17 In V , for any α, the state α¯ is a minimum of α̂. Therefore V is a
strong cumulative ordered model.
Proof: Lemma 11 says α¯ is a minimum of α̂ with respect to ≺. It is therefore a
minimum with respect to any weaker relation and in particular ≺+. Lemma 16
implies that ≺+ is asymmetric and, by lemma 5, V satisfies the smoothness
condition.
Lemma 18 α ∼ β iff α ∼V β.
Proof: Lemma 17 implies that the only minimal state of α̂ is α¯, therefore
α ∼V β iff all normal worlds for α satisfy β, and lemma 8 implies the conclusion.
We may now summarize.
Theorem 2 (Representation theorem for loop-cumulative relations) A
consequence relation is a loop-cumulative relation iff it is defined by some cu-
mulative ordered model.
As in the cumulative case one may study the notion of entailment yielded
by cumulative ordered models and obtain results that parallel corollaries 1, 2
and 3.
5 Preferential reasoning
5.1 The system P
We shall now consider a system that seems to occupy a central position in the
hierarchy of nonmonotonic systems. It is strictly stronger than CL, but assumes
the existence of disjunction in the language of formulas. We call this system P,
for preferential, because its semantics, described in section 5.2, are a variation
on those proposed by Y. Shoham in [38]. The differences (the distinction we
make and he does not between states and worlds) are nevertheless technically
important, as noticed above just before definition 2, and as will be shown at the
end of section 5.2. This very system has been considered by E. Adams [2] and
proposed by J. Pearl and H. Geffner [34] to serve as the conservative core of a
nonmonotonic reasoning system. It is the flat fragment of the system S studied
by J. Burgess in [4].
24
Definition 15 The system P consists of all the rules of C and the following:
α ∼ γ , β ∼ γ
α ∨ β ∼ γ
(Or) (16)
A consequence relation that satisfies all rules of P is said to be preferential.
The rule Or corresponds to the axiom CA of conditional logic. It says that
any formula that is, separately, a plausible consequence of two different formulas,
should also be a plausible consequence of their disjunction. It is a valid principle
of monotonic classical reasoning and does not imply monotonicity, therefore we
tend to accept it. Further consideration also seems to support Or: if we think
that if John attends the party, normally, the evening will be great and also that
if Cathy attends the party, normally, the evening will be great and hear that at
least one of Cathy or John will attend the party, shouldn’t we be tempted to
join in? There is, though, an epistemic reading of α ∼ β that invalidates the
Or rule. If we interpret α ∼ β as meaning: if all I know about the world is
α then it is sensible for me to suppose that β is true, we must reject the Or
rule. Indeed, one may imagine a situation in which α expresses a fact that can
very well be true or false but the truth value of which is normally not known
to me. If I knew α to be true, that would be quite an abnormal situation in
which I may be willing to accept γ. If I knew α to be false, similarly, it would
be an exceptional situation in which I may accept γ, but the knowledge that
α ∨ ¬α is true is essentially void and certainly does not allow me to conclude
that anything exceptional is happening. Notice that, in this reading, the left
hand side of the symbol ∼ involves a hidden epistemic operator (the right
hand side may also do so, but need not). We shall therefore defend the Or
rule by saying that such a hidden operator should be made explicit and the
example just above only invalidates the inference: from Kα ∼ γ and Kβ ∼ γ
infer K(α ∨ β) ∼ γ. But nobody would defend such an inference anyway.
The interplay between Or and the rules of C makes P a powerful system.
For example, Loop is a derived rule of P. Since this result will be obvious
once we have characterized preferential relations semantically, we shall leave a
proof-theoretic derivation of Loop in P for the reader to find.
We shall now put together a number of remarks revolving around the rule
Or. Our first remark is that we may derive from Or a rule that is similar to
the hard half of the deduction theorem. This rule was suggested in [39]. It is a
very useful rule and expresses the fact that deductions performed under strong
assumptions may be useful even if the assumptions are not known facts.
Lemma 19 In the presence of Reflexivity, Right Weakening and Left
Logical Equivalence, the rule of Or implies the following:
α ∧ β ∼ γ
α ∼ β → γ
(S) (17)
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S is therefore a derived rule of P.
Proof: Suppose α ∧ β ∼ γ. We have α ∧ β ∼ β → γ, by Right Weaken-
ing. But one has α ∧ ¬β ∼ β → γ. One concludes by Or and Left Logical
Equivalence.
Our second remark is that, in the presence of S, the rule of Cut is im-
plied by And. Therefore Reflexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right
Weakening, And, Or and Cautious Monotonicity are an elegant equiva-
lent axiomatization of the system P.
Lemma 20 In the presence of Right Weakening, S and And imply Cut.
Proof: Use S, And and Right Weakening.
D. Makinson [27] suggested the following rule. It expresses the principle of
proof by cases.
α ∧ ¬β ∼ γ , α ∧ β ∼ γ
α ∼ γ
(D) (18)
Lemma 21 In the presence of Reflexivity, Right Weakening and Left
Logical Equivalence,
1. Or implies D and
2. D implies Or in the presence of And.
Therefore D is a derived rule of P.
The proof is left to the reader.
The next lemma gathers some more derived rules of the system P. They
will be used in the proof of the representation theorem of section 5.3. The
importance of these rules is mainly technical. The reader should notice that P
is a powerful system, in which one may build quite sophisticated proofs.
Lemma 22 The following are derived rules of P:
α ∼ γ , β ∼ δ
α ∨ β ∼ γ ∨ δ
(19)
α ∨ γ ∼ γ , α ∼ β
γ ∼ α→ β
(20)
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α ∨ β ∼ α , β ∨ γ ∼ β
α ∨ γ ∼ α
(21)
α ∨ β ∼ α , β ∨ γ ∼ β
α ∼ γ → β
(22)
Proof: The uses of Left Logical Equivalence will not always be mentioned
any more. For (19), use first Right Weakening on each of the two hypotheses
and then Or. This seems to be a very intuitive rule that is often useful.
For (20), from the second hypothesis, using Left Logical Equivalence we
have (α ∨ γ) ∧ α ∼ β. By S we conclude α ∨ γ ∼ α→ β. But, using the first
hypothesis and Cautious Monotonicity one may now conclude.
For (21), from both hypotheses and using (19) one concludes α ∨ β ∨ γ ∼ α ∨ β.
Now, using our first hypothesis and (9) we see (α ∨ β) ∨ γ ∼ α. Leaving this
result for a moment, notice that from the first hypothesis and γ ∼ γ, using (19)
we obtain α ∨ β ∨ γ ∼ α ∨ γ. Now, coming back to the result we left hanging,
using Cautious Monotonicity, we may conclude.
For (22), from the second hypothesis one has (β ∨ γ) ∧ (α ∨ β ∨ γ) ∼ β.
By S: α ∨ β ∨ γ ∼ (β ∨ γ)→ β. By Right Weakening, one may then ob-
tain α ∨ β ∨ γ ∼ γ → β But from the two hypotheses, using (19), one obtains:
α ∨ β ∨ γ ∼ α ∨ β. Using Cautious Monotonicity on those last two results,
we obtain: α ∨ β ∼ γ → β. Using the first hypothesis and Cautious Mono-
tonicity one concludes.
5.2 Preferential Models
We may now describe our version of preferential models. Preferential models
are cumulative ordered models in which states are labeled by single worlds (and
not sets of worlds). The reasoner has, then, essentially, a preference over worlds
(except that the same world may label different states). We may now define the
family of models we are interested in.
Definition 16 A preferential model W is a triple 〈 S, l,≺〉 where S is a set, the
elements of which will be called states, l : S 7→ U assigns a world to each state
and ≺ is a strict partial order on S (i.e. an irreflexive, transitive relation),
satisfying the smoothness condition of definition 7.
Notice that, for a preferential model, s≡ α iff l(s) |= α. The smoothness
condition, here, as explained in section 4.1, is only a technical condition needed
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to deal with infinite sets of formulas, it is always satisfied in any preferential
model in which S is finite, or in which ≺ is well-founded (i.e. no infinite de-
scending chains). The requirement that the relation ≺ be a strict partial order
has been introduced only because such models are nicer and the smoothness
condition is easier to check on those models, but the soundness result of lemma
24 is true for the larger family of models, where ≺ is just any binary relation.
In such a case, obviously, the smoothness condition cannot be dropped even
for finite models. The completeness result of theorem 3 holds obviously, too,
for the larger family, but is less interesting. Preferential models, since they are
cumulative models, define consequence relations as in definition 8.
Y. Shoham, in [38], proposed a more restricted notion of preferential models.
He required the set of states S to be a subset of the universe U and the labeling
function l to be the identity. He also required the relation ≺ to be a well-order.
Any one of those two requirements would make the representation theorem
incorrect. The second point is treated in [22]. For the first point, we leave it
as an exercise to the reader to show that the following model has no equivalent
model in which no label appears twice. Let L be the propositional calculus on
two variables p and q. Let S have four states: s0 ≺ s2 and s1 ≺ s3. Let s0
satisfy p and ¬q, s1 satisfy ¬p and ¬q and s2 and s3 both satisfy p and q.
5.3 Characterization of preferential consequence relations
Our first lemma is obvious. It does not hold in cumulative models and should
be contradistincted with lemma 6.
Lemma 23 LetW = 〈 S, l,≺〉 be a preferential model. For any α, β ∈ L, α̂ ∨ β = α̂ ∪ β̂.
Lemma 24 (Soundness) For any preferential model W , the consequence re-
lation ∼W it defines is a preferential relation, i.e. all the rules of the system
P are satisfied by the relations defined by preferential models.
Proof: Indeed, as we remarked above, the fact that ≺ is a partial order is
not used at all. Since a preferential model is a cumulative model, in light of
lemma 7, we only need to check the validity ofOr. Suppose a preferential model
W = 〈S, l,≺〉 and α, β, γ ∈ L are given. Suppose that α ∼W γ and β ∼W γ.
Any state minimal in α̂ ∨ β is, by lemma 23, minimal in the set α̂ ∪ β̂, and
therefore minimal in any of the subsets it belongs to.
We shall now begin the proof of the representation theorem. Let us, first, de-
fine a relation among formulas, that will turn out to be a pre-ordering whenever
the relation ∼ satisfies P.
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Definition 17 We say that α is not less ordinary than β and write α ≤ β iff
α ∨ β ∼ α.
Indeed, if we would conclude that α is true on the basis that either α or β is
true, this means that the former is not more out of the ordinary than the latter.
Notice that, if ∼ satisfies Reflexivity and Left Logical Equivalence, then
for any α, β ∈ L, α ∨ β ≤ α.
Lemma 25 If the relation ∼ is preferential, the relation ≤ is reflexive and
transitive.
Proof: Reflexivity follows from Left Logical Equivalence and Reflexivity.
Transitivity follows from (21) of lemma 22.
From now on, and until theorem 3, we shall suppose that the relation ∼ is
preferential.
Lemma 26 If α ≤ β and m is a normal world for α that satisfies β, then m is
a normal world for β.
Proof: Suppose β ∼ δ. By (20) of lemma 22, we have α ∼ β → δ. If m is
normal for α it must satisfy β → δ, and since it satisfies β, it must satisfy δ.
Lemma 27 If α ≤ β ≤ γ and m is a normal world for α that satisfies γ then
it is a normal world for β.
Proof: By lemma 26, it is enough to show that m satisfies β. By (22) of
lemma 22 we have α ∼ γ → β, but m is a normal world for α that satisfies γ,
therefore it must satisfy β.
We may now describe the preferential model we need for the representation
result. Remember that we start from any preferential relation ∼ . We then
consider the following model: W
def
= 〈 S, l,≺〉 where
1. S
def
= {< m,α > | m is a normal world for α},
2. l(< m,α >) = m and
3. < m,α >≺< n, β > iff α ≤ β and m 6|= β.
The first thing we want to show is that W is a preferential model, i.e. that
≺ is a strict partial order and that W satisfies the smoothness condition. We
shall then show that the relation ∼W is exactly ∼ .
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Lemma 28 The relation ≺ is a strict partial order, i.e. it is irreflexive and
transitive.
Proof: The relation ≺ is irreflexive since < m,α >≺< m,α > would imply
m 6|= α, but m is a normal world for α, and since α ∼ α by Reflexivity, it sat-
isfies α. It is left to show that ≺ is transitive. Suppose < m0, α0 >≺< m1, α1 >
and < m1, α1 >≺< m2, α2 >. By the definition of ≺ we have α0 ≤ α1 and
α1 ≤ α2. From this we may conclude two things. First, by lemma 25 we con-
clude α0 ≤ α2. Secondly, since m0 is a normal world for α0 that does not satisfy
α1, we may conclude by lemma 27 that it does not satisfy α2.
We are now going to characterize all minimal states in sets of the form α̂.
Lemma 29 In the model W , < m, β > is minimal in α̂ iff m |= α and β ≤ α.
Proof: For the if part, suppose m |= α and β ≤ α. Clearly m ∈ α̂. Suppose
now that < n, γ >≺< m, β > and n |= α. We would have γ ≤ β ≤ α, n normal
for γ, and n 6|= β and m |= α. This stands in contradiction with lemma 27.
For the only if part, suppose < m, β > is minimal in α̂. Clearlym |= α. Sup-
pose n is a normal world for α ∨ β that does not satisfy β (it is not claimed that
such a normal world exists). Since α ∨ β ≤ α, we must have< n, α ∨ β >≺< m, β >.
But n is a normal world for α ∨ β that does not satisfy β and therefore must sat-
isfy α. This stands in contradiction with the minimality of < m, β > in α̂. We
conclude that every normal world for α ∨ β satisfies β. By lemma 8, α ∨ β ∼ β.
We shall now prove that W satisfies the smoothness condition.
Lemma 30 For any α ∈ L, α̂ is smooth.
Proof: Suppose < m, β >∈ α̂, i.e., m |= α. If β ≤ α then, by lemma 29
< m, β > is minimal in α̂. On the other hand, if α ∨ β 6∼ β then by lemma 8
there is a normal world n for α ∨ β such that n 6|= β. But α ∨ β ≤ β and there-
fore < n, α ∨ β >≺< m, β >. But, n |= α ∨ β and n 6|= β therefore n |= α. Since
α ∨ β ≤ α, Lemma 29 enables us to conclude that < n, α ∨ β > is minimal in α̂.
We have shown that W is a preferential model. We shall now show that
∼W is exactly the relation ∼ we started from.
Lemma 31 If α ∼ β, then α ∼W β.
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Proof: We must show that all minimal states of α̂ satisfy β. Suppose < m, γ >
is minimal in α̂. Then m is a normal world for γ that satisfies α. By lemma 29,
γ ≤ α and therefore, by lemma 26, m is a normal world for α.
Lemma 32 If α ∼W β, then α ∼ β.
Proof: It follows from the definition of the relation ≺ (lemma 29 could also be
used, but is not really necessary here) that, given any normal world m for α,
< m,α > is minimal in α̂. If α ∼W β, β is satisfied by all normal worlds for α,
and we may conclude by lemma 8.
We may now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 3 (Representation theorem for preferential relations) A con-
sequence relation is a preferential consequence relation iff it is defined by some
preferential model.
Proof: The if part is Lemma 24. For the only if part, let ∼ be any consequence
relation satisfying the rules above and let W be defined as above. Lemmas 28
and 30 show that W is a preferential model. Lemmas 31 and 32 show that it
defines an consequence relation that is exactly ∼ .
As in the cumulative and cumulative ordered cases we may study the notion
of preferential entailment and obtain results similar to Corollaries 1, 2 and 3.
5.4 Some rules that cannot be derived in P
Is P a reasonable system for nonmonotonic reasoning? We think a good rea-
soning system should validate all the rules of P. Notice that all the rules we
have considered so far are of the form: from the presence of certain assertions
in the consequence relation, deduce the presence of some other assertion. After
careful consideration of many other rules of this form, we may say we have good
reason to think that there are no rules of this type that should be added. Cer-
tain principles of reasoning that seem appealing, though, fail to be validated by
certain preferential consequence relations. This means, in our sense, that many
agents that reason in a way that is fully consistent with all the rules of P, nev-
ertheless behave irrationally. We shall show that circumscription does not, in
general, satisfy even the weakest of the principles we shall present. The reader
will notice that the form of these principles is different from that of all the rules
previously discussed: from the absence of certain assertions in the relation, we
deduce the absence of some other assertion.
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α ∧ γ 6∼ β , α ∧ ¬γ 6∼ β
α 6∼ β
(Negation Rationality) (23)
α 6∼ γ , β 6∼ γ
α ∨ β 6∼ γ
(Disjunctive Rationality) (24)
α ∧ β 6∼ γ , α 6∼ ¬β
α 6∼ γ
(Rational Monotonicity) (25)
Each one of those rules is implied byMonotonicity and therefore expresses
some kind of restricted monotonicity. Any rational reasoner should, in our
opinion, support them, and we shall, now, explain and justify them. The rule of
Negation Rationality says that inferences are not made solely on the basis of
ignorance. If we accept that β is a plausible consequence of α, we must either
accept that it is a plausible consequence of α ∧ γ or accept that it is a plausible
consequence of α ∧ ¬γ. Indeed, suppose we hold that normally, the party should
be great, but that we do not hold that even if Peter comes to the party, it will be
great, i.e. we seriously doubt the party could stand Peter’s presence. It seems
we could not possibly hold that we also seriously doubt that the party could
stand Peter’s absence. If we do not expect the party to be great if Peter is there
and do not expect it to be great if Peter is not there, how could we expect it to
be great? After all, either Peter is going to be there or he is not. It is, though,
easy to find examples of preferential models that define consequence relations
that do not satisfy Negation Rationality.
We shall even show, now, that circumscriptive reasoning does not always
obeys Negation Rationality. Suppose our language has two unary predicate
symbols special and beautiful, and one individual constant a. We know that,
normally an object is not special, i.e. we circumscribe by minimizing the ex-
tension of special, keeping beautiful constant. Take α to be true and β to be
¬special (a). Indeed, without any information, we shall suppose that a is not
special. But take γ to be beautiful(a)↔ special (a). If we had the information
that a is beautiful if and only if it is special, we could not conclude that a is
not special anymore, since it could well be beautiful, i.e. there are two minimal
models that must be considered: the first one with a neither beautiful nor spe-
cial and the second one with a beautiful and special. On the other hand, had
we had the informatiom that either a is beautiful or it is special but not both,
we could not have concluded that it is not special either, since it could well not
be beautiful. It seems that circumscription may lead to unexpected conclusions.
The example presented here is a simplification, due to M. Ginsberg, of an ex-
ample due to the second author. If we try to understand where circumscription
differs from intuitive reasoning, we probably will have to say that, even with the
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knowledge that a is special if and only if it is beautiful, we would have kept the
expectation that it is not special, and therefore gained the expectation that it is
not beautiful. Similarly, with the knowledge that a is either special or beautiful
but not both, we would have kept the expectation that it is not special and
therefore formed the expectation that it is beautiful.
The rule of Disjunctive Rationality says that inferences made from a
disjunction of propositions must be supported by at least one of the component
propositions. Again, this seems like a reasonable requirement. If we do not
hold that if Peter comes to the party, it will be great and do not hold that if
Cathy comes to the party, it will be great, how could we hold that if at least one
of Peter or Cathy comes, the party will be great? In this example, the reader
may prefer to read even if instead of if, but the conclusion stands anyway. It
is easy to see that Disjunctive Rationality implies Negation Rationality.
The second author recently showed that Disjunctive Rationality is strictly
stronger than Negation Rationality.
The rule of Rational Monotonicity is similar to the axiom CV of condi-
tional logic. It expresses the fact that only additional information the negation
of which was expected should force us to withdraw plausible conclusions previ-
ously drawn. It is an important tool in minimizing the updating we have to do
when learning new information. Suppose we hold that normally, the party will
be great but do not hold that even if Peter comes, the party will be great, i.e. we
think Peter’s presence could well spoil the party, shouldn’t we hold that nor-
mally, Peter will not come to the party? One easily shows that, in the presence
of the rules of C, Rational Monotonicity implies Disjunctive Rationality.
D. Makinson proved that Rational Monotonicity is strictly stronger than
Disjunctive Rationality and conjectured a model-theoretic characterization
of preferential relations that satisfy Rational Monotonicity. The second au-
thor proved the corresponding representation result in the case the language L
is finite. The third author lifted the restriction on L. These results will appear
in a separate paper.
5.5 Examples: diamonds and triangles
We shall now show what preferential reasoning may provide in the setting of
two toy situations that have become classics in the literature. First the so-called
Nixon diamond. Suppose our knowledge base K contains the four assertions
that follow. The reader may read teen-ager for t, poor for p, student for s and
employed for e.
1. t ∼ p
2. t ∼ s
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3. p ∼ e
4. s ∼ ¬e
It is easy to see, by describing suitable preferential models, that no assertion
that would look like some kind of contradiction is preferentially entailed by
K. In particular neither t ∼ e, nor t ∼ ¬e is preferentially entailed by K. We
cannot conclude, from the information given above, that teen-agers are nor-
mally employed, neither can we conclude that they generally are not employed.
This seems much preferable than the consideration of multiple extensions. This
weakness of the system P seems to be exactly what we want. Nevertheless, pref-
erential reasoning allows for some quite subtle conclusions. For example the fol-
lowing assertions are preferentially entailed by K: true ∼ ¬t (normally, people
are not teen-agers), true ∼ ¬(p ∧ s) (normally, people are not poor students).
The following assertions are not preferentially entailed: s ∼ ¬p (students, nor-
mally are not poor), or p ∼ ¬s (poor persons are normally not students), and
we feel indeed that there is not enough information in K to justify them. An
example of an assertion that is not preferentially entailed by K but we think
should follow from K is: a ∧ p ∼ e, since a is not mentioned in K. The reader
may consult [20] for a possible solution.
A second classical example is the penguin triangle. Suppose our knowledge
base K contains the three assertions that follow. The reader may read penguin
for p, flies for f , and bird for b.
1. p ∼ b
2. p ∼ ¬f
3. b ∼ f
It is easy to see, by describing suitable preferential models, that no assertion
that would lead to some kind of contradiction is preferentially entailed by K.
In particular p ∼ f is not preferentially entailed by K. On the other hand, the
following assertions are preferentially entailed byK and we leave it to the reader
to show that they are satisfied by all preferential models that satisfy K:
1. p ∧ b ∼ ¬f
2. f ∼ ¬p
3. b ∼ ¬p
4. b ∨ p ∼ f
5. b ∨ p ∼ ¬p
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The reader should remark that no multiple extension problem arises here
and that preferential reasoning correctly chooses the most specific information
and in effect pre-empts the application of a less specific default.
5.6 Horn assertions
In this section we shall show that, if we consider only assertions of a restricted
type (i.e. Horn assertions), then the system P is no stronger than CL. For this
result we shall need the full strength of theorem 2. To keep notations simple,
let us suppose L is a propositional language.
Definition 18 An assertion α ∼ β will be called a Horn assertion iff the an-
tecedent α is a conjunction of zero or more propositional variables and the con-
sequent β is either a single propositional variable or the formula false.
The crucial remark is the following.
Lemma 33 If W is a cumulative ordered model, there is a preferential model
V such that ∼W and ∼V coincide as far as Horn assertions are concerned.
Proof: Let W be the model 〈 S, l,≺〉. We shall define V to be the model
〈 S, l′,≺〉, where l′ is defined in the following way. For any s ∈ S and for any
propositional variable p, l′(s) |= p iff for every u ∈ l(s), u |= p, in other words
iff s≡ p in W . It is clear that, if α is a conjunction of propositional variables
then the sets α̂ in W and V coincide. Therefore, if W satisfies the smoothness
condition, so does V and ∼W and ∼V agree on Horn formulas.
Theorem 4 Let K be a knowledge base containing only Horn assertions, and
A a Horn assertion. If the assertion A may be derived from K in the system
P, then it may be derived from K in the system CL.
Proof: Suppose A cannot be derived in CL. By the representation theorem 2,
there is a cumulative ordered model W that satisfies all the assertions of K, but
does not satisfy A. By lemma 33, there is a preferential model V that satisfies
K, but does not satisfy A. We conclude, by the soundness part of theorem 3,
that A cannot be derived in P.
6 Cumulative monotonic reasoning
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6.1 The system CM
In section 3.3, three rules were shown equivalent in the presence of the rules of
C. We shall now study the system obtained by adding those rules (or one of
them) to the system C. One obtains a system that is strictly stronger than CL,
but incomparable with P. It is corresponds to some natural family of models.
Definition 19 The system CM contains all the rules of C and the rule of
Monotonicity, defined in (10). A consequence relation that satisfies all the
rules of CM is said to be cumulative monotonic.
In fact, Left Logical Equivalence and Cautious Monotonicity are now
redundant, since they follow fromMonotonicity. From lemma 3, one sees that
EHD andTransitivity are derived rules of CM. It is obvious that Loop is also
a derived rule of CM (by Transitivity). It is not difficult to find preferential
models that do not satisfyMonotonicity and we conclude that CM is strictly
stronger than CL and not weaker than P.
6.2 Simple cumulative models
Definition 20 A cumulative model will be called a simple cumulative model iff
the binary relation ≺ on its states is empty.
A simple cumulative model is a cumulative ordered model. The smoothness
condition is always satisfied in such a model. It is very easy to see that the
consequence relation defined by any simple cumulative model satisfies Mono-
tonicity. It is not difficult to find simple cumulative models that do not satisfy
certain instances of the Or rule. We conclude that P and CM are incompara-
ble. It is also easy to find such models that do not satisfy certain instances of
Contraposition.
6.3 Characterization of monotonic cumulative consequence
relations
Theorem 5 (Representation theorem for cumulative monotonic relations)
A consequence relation is cumulative monotonic iff it is defined by some simple
cumulative model.
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Proof: It has been noticed above that the if part is trivial. For the only if
part, suppose ∼ is a consequence relation that satisfies the rules of CM. Let
W
def
= 〈A, l, ∅〉, where A ⊆ L is the set of all formulas α such that α 6∼ false
and l
def
= {m | m is a normal world for α}. Lemma 8 implies that all labels are
non-empty. By lemma 8, for any formula α, α̂ = {β | β ∼ α}. Since all states
of α̂ are minimal in α̂, we see that α ∼W β iff for all γ such that γ ∼ α and all
normal worlds m for γ, m |= β. By lemma 8 this last condition is equivalent to
γ ∼ β and we have: α ∼W β iff for any γ, γ ∼ α⇒ γ ∼ β. Suppose α ∼ β,
take any γ such that γ ∼ α, we have by Transitivity, a derived rule of CM,
γ ∼ β. Therefore α ∼W β. Suppose now that α ∼W β, then, by taking γ = α
one sees that α ∼ β.
As in the cumulative, cumulative ordered and preferential cases, one may
study the notion of entailment yielded by simple cumulative models and obtain
results similar to Corollaries 1, 2 and 3.
7 Monotonic reasoning
7.1 The system M
The results presented in this section are probably folklore. They are presented
here for completeness’ sake.
Definition 21 The system M consists of all the rules of C and the rule of
Contraposition. A consequence relation that satisfies all the rules of M is
said to be monotonic.
Lemma 4 and the results to come will show that the system M is strictly
stronger than P and CM.
Lemma 34 The rule Or is a derived rule of M.
Proof: Use Contraposition twice, then And and finally Contraposition.
Lemma 35 A consequence relation is monotonic iff it satisfies Reflexivity,
Right Weakening, Monotonicity, And and Or.
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Proof: The only if part follows from lemmas 2, 4 and 34. For the if part,
notice, first, that Left Logical Equivalence and Cautious Monotonicity
are special cases of Monotonicity. The remark preceding lemma 20 shows
that all rules of P may be derived from the rules above. We must now show
that Contraposition may be derived from the rules of P and Monotonicity.
Suppose α ∼ β. By S, one has true ∼ α→ β. By Right Weakening, we
conclude true ∼ ¬β → ¬α. ByMonotonicity, we have ¬β ∼ ¬β → ¬α. We
conclude by Reflexivity and MPC.
7.2 Simple preferential models
The account of monotonic reasoning that we propose is essentially the following.
The agent has in mind a set of possible worlds V : this is the set of worlds the
agent thinks are possible in practice. This set V is a subset of the set U of all
logically possible worlds. The agent is willing to conclude β from α if all worlds
of V that satisfy α also satisfy β.
Definition 22 A simple preferential model is a preferential model in which the
binary relation ≺ is empty.
A simple preferential model is a simple cumulative model in which the la-
beling function l labels each state with a single world. Since repeated labels are
obviously useless we could, as well, have considered a model to be a subset of
U .
7.3 Characterization of monotonic consequence relations
Theorem 6 (Representation theorem for monotonic relations) A con-
sequence relation is monotonic iff it is defined by some simple preferential model.
Proof: The proof of the if part is trivial. For the only if part we shall build
a simple preferential model for any given monotonic consequence relation ∼ .
Let V
def
= {m ∈ U | ∀α,β ∈ L, if α ∼ β then m |= α→ β } and let W
def
= 〈 V, l〉
where l is the identity function. So, m≡ α iff m |= α.
We shall prove that α ∼ β iff α ∼W β. If α ∼ β then by the construction
of V , α ∼W β. Suppose now that α 6∼ β, we shall show that there is a world
m ∈ V that does not satisfy α→ β. Let Γ0
def
= {¬β} ∪ {δ| α ∼ δ}. Since α 6∼ β,
Γ0 is satisfiable (the full proof is given in a more general case in lemma 8). Let
m be a world that satisfies Γ0. We shall prove that ∀ϕ, ψ ∈ L if ϕ ∼ ψ then
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m |= ϕ→ ψ. If ϕ ∼ ψ then true ∼ ϕ→ ψ by S and α ∼ ϕ→ ψ by Mono-
tonicity. Therefore, ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ0 by the definition of Γ0, and m |= ϕ→ ψ. We
conclude that m ∈ V and clearly m≡ α but m 6≡ β.
It will now be shown that all the constructions and results described above
relativize without problems to a given set of conditional assertions.
Corollary 4 Let K be a set of conditional assertions, and α, β ∈ L. Let ∆
def
=
{γ → δ | γ ∼ δ ∈ K} and let W be the monotonic model 〈 U∆, l 〉, where l is
the identity function. The notation U∆ has been defined in section 2.1. The
following conditions are equivalent. If they are satisfied we shall say that K
monotonically entails α ∼ β.
1. for all monotonic models V such that ∼V contains K, α ∼V β
2. α ∼W β
3. α ∼ β has a proof from K in the system M.
4. α→ β follows logically (with respect to U) from the formulas of ∆.
Proof: We shall first show the equivalence of 1 and 2. The relation defined in
1 is the intersection of all those monotonic consequence relations that contain
K. If V is any monotonic model such that ∼V contains K then the labels of
its states must be in U∆ (as defined in 2) and therefore ∼V contains ∼W .
But ∼W contains K and is one of the relations considered in 1. To see the
equivalence of 1 and 3, notice that the relation defined in 3 is the intersection
of all those monotonic relations that contain K. Theorem 6 implies that 1 and
3 define the same relation. The equivalence between 2 and 4 is immediate.
From the equivalence of conditions 1 and 3 one easily proves the following
compactness result:
Corollary 5 (compactness) K monotonically entails α ∼ β iff a finite sub-
set of K does.
8 Summary, future work and conclusion
Five families of models and consequence relations have been defined and their
relations will be summarized here. Each family has been characterized by a logi-
cal system and no two of those systems are equivalent. The family of cumulative
models contains all other families and is characterized by the logical system C
that consists of Logical Left Equivalence, Right Weakening, Reflexivity,
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Cut and Cautious Monotonicity. The next largest family is that of cumula-
tive ordered models. It contains all three families not yet mentioned here. It is
characterized by the logical system CT that contains, in addition to the rules
of C, the rule of Loop. The families of simple cumulative models and of pref-
erential models are two incomparable subfamilies of the family of cumulative
ordered models. Simple cumulative models are characterized by the logical sys-
tem CM that contains, in addition to the rules of C, the rule ofMonotonicity
(or equivalently, Transitivity). The family of preferential models, probably
the most important one, is characterized by the logical system P that contains,
in addition to the rules of C the rule of Or. The family of monotonic models is
the smallest one of them all. It is contained in all other four. It is characterized
by the logical systemM that contains, in addition to the rules of C, both rules
Monotonicity and Or.
Of those families of consequence relations, which is the best suited to rep-
resent the inferences of a nonmonotonic reasoner in the presence of a fixed
knowledge base? Monotonic and and cumulative monotonic reasoning are too
powerful, i.e. simple cumulative and simple preferential models are too restric-
tive to represent the wealth of nonmonotonic inference procedures we would like
to consider. We feel that all bona fide logical systems should implement reason-
ing patterns that fall inside the framework of cumulative reasoning, but probably
not all cumulative models represent useful nonmonotonic systems. The same
may probably said about cumulative ordered models. Preferential reasoning
seems to be closest to what we are looking for.
Nevertheless, many preferential reasoners lack properties that seem desir-
able, for example Rational Monotonicity. A major problem that is not
solved in this paper is to describe reasonable inference procedures that would
guarantee that the set of assertions that may be deduced from any conditional
knowledge base satisfies the property of Rational Monotonicity. The second
author proposed a solution to this problem in [20]. Another major problem, not
solved here, is to extend the results presented here to predicate calculus and
answer the question: how should quantifiers be treated, or what is the meaning
of the conditional assertion bird(x) ∼ fly(x)? The second and third authors
have a solution, still unpublished, to this problem too.
We hope the results presented above will convince the reader that the field of
artificial nonmonotonic reasoning may benefit from the study of nonmonotonic
consequence relations.
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